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Introduction & Literature
In this paper I analyze the stability of equilibrium behavior in second price allpay auctions of incomplete information with two contestants. An allpay auction is a contest in which each contestant exerts efforts that are foregone regardless of winning the prize. In a second price allpay auction, the winner pays the second highest bid and all other contestants pay their own bid. This contest is also known as the 'War of Attrition' which was introduced by Maynard Smith (1974) . Beside the biological interpretation, an allpay auction is a situation to which social agents are exposed in daily routine: a successful job market candidate needs to be better qualified than the second best candidate, a sprinter needs to poke his or her nose a fraction of a second over the finish line before the second fastest athlete. Electoral first-pass-thepost campaigns, lobbying, academic research, public invations to tender, and irreducible investments with conditional stochastic yields are all examples in which monetary or non-monetary spendings are sunk before the final allocation of the prize is fixed. These situations also share the property that the absolute value of the bid is irrelevant -what matters is relative bid intensities. I study contests in which the valuation for the prize is private information. Situations in which the prize is equally valuable for all contestants but the cost of exerting efforts differ are every bit as plausible as the setting chosen here and can be seen as equivalent after a transformation of payoffs.
Maynard Smith (1974) 's 'War of Attrition' and related allpay auctions have been shown to be the limit of other, more general models as in Abreu & Gul (2000) who develop a model of reputation based bargaining or Lang et al. (2010) who analyze stochastic (Poisson) contests and Che & Gale (2000) who analyze rent seeking games. Bishop, Cannings & Maynard Smith (1978) characterize the ESS for the case of incomplete information. Milgrom & Weber (1985) show that as uncertainty approaches zero, the distribution of the (pure) bids converges to the mixed strategy distribution of Maynard Smith (1974) . The War of Attrition with incomplete information has also been studied by Nalebuff & Riley (1985) and Ponsati & Sákovics (1995) .
It is understood that the War of Attrition, or other allpay auctions can be found in many economic applications, such as the IO models 'The Generalized War of Attrition' in Bulow & Klemperer (1999) or Konrad (2006) . Beside Maynard Smith (1974) , allpay auctions with complete information have been studied by Tullock (1980) , Baye, Kovenock & De Vries (1996) , Siegel (2009 ), and Moldovanu & Sela (2001 ) Rose (1978 studies the evolutionary stability of allpay first price auctions (Scotch Auctions), the stability of first price auctions in which only the winner pays has been studied by Hon-Snir, Monderer & Sela (1998) and Louge & Riedel (2010) . The War of Attrition in finite populations has been studied by Riley (1980) , allpay auctions (Tullock-contest) have been shown to exhibit non-Nash behavior for finite populations by Leininger (2009) . Damianov, Oechssler & Becker (2010) investigate whether a uniform or a discriminatory price auction is better for the seller in an experiment. Bishop, Cannings & Maynard Smith (1978) use the concept of evolutionary stability in a game with continuous strategies. For such games it has been proposed to use other concepts as neighborhood invader strategy (NIS, Apaloo (1997 Apaloo ( , 2006 ), continuously stable strategy (CSS, Eshel (1983) ), evolutionary robustness (ER, Oechssler & Riedel (2002) , and asymmetric CSS and NIS (Cressman (2010) ), because it has been shown that evolutionary stability is not sufficient for dynamic stability if strategies are continuous. Already show convergence to the ESS in their 'Generalized War of Attrition' only for finite strategy sets. To stress that the critique of the use of ESS is long known I quote Hofbauer, Schuster & Sigmund (1979), p.611: "(...) [I]t could be that under certain circumstances it would be more appropriate to study asymptotically stable equilibria of (l), rather than ESS."
The referred to equation (1) is the replicator dynamic.
The effect of discretization of a continuous game is the subject of Alós-Ferrer (2006) . Also Boudreau (2010) studies allpay auctions with discrete action spaces. Krishna & Morgan (1997) develop a model in which allpay auctions raise more expected revenue than other sealed-bid auction forms. Leininger (2000) sees the allpay auction as a benchmark lottery and discusses the role of the revenue equivalence theorem in understanding the differences of auction types.
This paper adds to the literature that analyzes the dynamic stability of equilibrium strategies in auctions. In the current setting, a strategy is a mapping from a continuum of types (valuations) into the non-negative reals. For such strategies the literature does not agree on the notion of stability. I prove the existence of an invader strategy which is destabilizing for an open set of valuations for any continuous distribution of valuations. I show that there is no strategy with such a property for all valuations. I show that the equilibrium strategy is not continuously stable (Eshel (1983) ). I hereby claim that there is no good argument for dynamic stability of the equilibrium strategy in the war of attrition with private valuations. Section 2 presents the static model and its equilibrium, section 3 discusses the use of the stability concept. Sections 4 and 5 collect the analytic respective the numeric results and section 6 concludes.
The Static Model
Let there be two contestants, each having a valuation in the set V ⊂ R + , where V is an interval containing the valuationv. The valuations are distributed according to a cdf F with continuous positive density f . Let B = R + be the set of bids that a contestant can choose from. A pure bid-strategy is a mapping β : V → B that assigns for each valuation v ∈ V a bid β(v) ∈ B. If one contestant uses strategy β, the other contestant with bid b and valuation v expects to receive payoffs
gets prize and pays opponent's bid.
− β(w))f (w)dw gets half of the prize and pays opponent's bid.
− {w:β(w)>b} bf (w)dw does not get the prize and pays own bid.
If F ({w : β(w) = b}) = 0 for all b ∈ B, the payoffs can be expressed as
5 2.1 Equilibrium Bishop, Cannings & Maynard Smith (1978) show that the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium consists of the strategy
If F is the uniform distribution on [0, 1], then If the valuation is fixed atv, F ({w : w =v}) = 1 Maynard Smith (1974) shows that the unique symmetric equilibrium 1 consists of the mixed strategy Maynard Smith (1974) shows that the mixed strategy is an ESS in the game of complete information and Bishop, Cannings & Maynard Smith (1978) show evolutionary stability of the pure strategy equilibrium in the game of incomplete information. Milgrom & Weber (1985) argue that if F is uniformly concentrated on a neighborhood (v − ǫ,v + ǫ), then in equilibrium (β, β) the distribution of bids converges to the distribution induced by σ(b) if ǫ → 0.
Dynamic Stability
To analyze dynamic stability, we have the following interpretation of the model: suppose that there is an infinite population of contestants each having a fixed valuation such that the distribution of valuations matches F . To play the contest, two agents are independently and uniformly matched. For each agent a strategy is an element of B rather than a mapping β : V → B. A stability condition needs to hold for each single valuation v. Bishop, Cannings & Maynard Smith (1978) show that the condition for evolutionary stability does hold for each valuation. As several authors pointed out, the standard notion of ESS is not sufficient for dynamic stability in games of infinite strategies. For such games CSS, NIS, and ER have been proposed.
Any of these concepts require stability against mass deviations. A mass deviation describes a situation in which each agent of the population simultaneously deviates to an identical strategy. This seems to be a very odd and implausible event as 'trembles' of 'mutations' usually are seen as independent events. Why can the whole population independently and undirectedly 'mutate' to the same deviation strategy? In the Bayesian game considered here, I show below that there is a correlation device that gives a plausible interpretation for mass deviations and that this mass deviations is triggered by an arbitrarily small subgroup of agents.
discrete vs continuous strategy sets
Consider a game with two pure strategies "0" and "1". Suppose the current state is that all agents play "0". Let us have a brief view on two distinct deviations:
Deviation A: a small fraction ǫ of agents deviate to the strategy "1". Deviation B: all agents deviate to the mixed strategy (1 − ǫ) · "0" + ǫ · "1".
Let σ i ǫ be the pure strategy played by a randomly chosen agent after the deviation i ∈ {A, B}. Then Prob(σ 
. 
and is a simplified version of the Prohorov metric for the special case if S ⊂ R + . Note that d A (·) and d B (·) coincide on finite strategy sets.
A justification for B-deviations
If F is uniform on [0, 1], the equilibrium strategy is β(v) = − ln(1 − v) − v for all v. Imagine that f and F change slightly to
for a ∈ (0, 1]. If a = 1, then f a is the density of the sum of two variables that are uniform on [0,
]. The equilibrium strategy changes to
If a = 1 then
A sudden change from f a to f can then be seen as a B-deviation: given f the equilibrium strategy is β, but the population still plays the strategy β a .
More generally, consider a situation in which the valuations are distributed according to a distribution function G with density g and the population plays equilibrium strategy γ with γ(v) = v 0
dw for all v ∈ V. If a small group of agents with fixed valuations enters the population, then the distribution of valuations changes slightly from G to F (and g to f ) . This invasion by a small group is as if the whole population simultaneously and identically deviates to strategy γ which is distinct and close to the equilibrium strategy β with β(v) = v 0
In the sections below I investigate whether the conditions are met such that agents of any type v change their strategy from γ(v) to β(v) in payoff monotonic dynamics.
Definitions
For symmetric games with finite sets of strategies an evolutionarily stable strategy is defined as a strategy that cannot be invaded by any similar strategy:
Definition 1 (ESS) A strategy x is an evolutionarily stable strategy if
π(x, x) ≥ π(y, x) for any strategy y and if π(x, x) = π(y, x) for some y, then π(x, y) > π(y, y).
The logic behind the definition is that whenever a homogenous ESS population is invaded by a small portion of mutants, the ESS agents have a selective advantage against the mixture in which the population mainly plays the evolutionarily stable strategy and a small fraction mutates. Still, definition 1 technically allows for two interpretations of mutations. The first, and usually preferred interpretation is that mutations happen independently and undirected. This means that only a very small fraction of agents mutates and that the mutant strategy can be any strategy of the set of strategies. The second interpretation, merely from a correlated shocks perspective, is that almost all agents change their strategy, but the new strategy must be very similar to the original one. Hofbauer, Schuster & Sigmund (1979) show that a strategy is ESS if and only if it satisfies π(x, y) > π(y, y) for all y = x if the game is finite. Weibull (1995) 
coins this condition
Definition 2 (local superiority, Weibull 1995) x is locally superior if it has a neighborhood U such that π(x, y) > π(y, y) for all y = x in U .
It is exactly this condition which was used by Hofbauer, Schuster & Sigmund (1979) to construct a Lyapunov function to show asymptotic stability. It will reappear in the definitions of stability that follow.
The following definition for neighborhood invader strategy says that if the population mainly uses a strategy y that is distinct to the neighborhood invader strategy x, x has a selective advantage over y.
Definition 3 (NIS, Apaloo 2006)
A strategy x is a neighborhood invader strategy if for any y: π(x, y) ≥ π(y, y) and if π(x, y) = π(y, y) then π(x, x) > π(y, x).
Strategy x is a local NIS (Apaloo 1997) , if the definition above holds for all y close to x. If NIS x is considered to be robust against mutations, the interpretation of stability for this concept is that the population mainly mutates to a strategy y which is close but selection still favors x.
Eshel (1983) also considers deviations of type B given some ESS x when asking "If a large enough majority of the population prefers a strategy y which is sufficiently close to x (...), will it be advantageous for each individual in this population to choose a strategy closer to, rather than further apart from x?" Definition 4 (CSS, Eshel 1983) An ESS x is continuously stable if there is a value ǫ > 0 such that for any strategy y ǫ−close to x there is some δ > 0 such that for any strategy u at a δ-distance to y it holds that π(u, y) > π(y, y) if and only if |u − x| < |y − x|.
Eshel (1983) also offers a necessary and a sufficient condition for continuous stability which involve the second derivative of the payoff function with respect to the strategy of the opponent. In the game studied here, the strategy of the opponent is the population strategy which is a function mapping valuations to bids and the necessary and sufficient conditions cannot be applied.
The next definition is perhaps the strongest notion of dynamic stability in non-cooperative games as it it requires robustness against the largest set of deviations.
Definition 5 (ER, Oechssler & Riedel 2002)
A strategy x is ER if π(x, y) > π(y, y) for all y = x that are ǫ-close to x in the Prohorov metric.
The definition is originally stated for mixed strategies, for the purpose of this paper it suffices to give the defintion for pure strategies. Note that NIS ⇔ ER but that the local version of NIS is necessary for ER.
In the next section I argue that for some valuations the equilibrium strategy β neither is a locally superior or locally NIS nor CSS and hereby that the conditions for ER are not met.
Maynard Smith (1974) shows for the mixed equilibrium σ(b) =
for all pure strategies m ∈ R + , hence π(σ, δ m ) > π(m, δ m ) for all m ∈ R + . Therefore we may conclude for the war of attrition without private information that the mixed equilibrium is evolutionarily robust.
Corollary 1 The fully mixed equilibrium in the war of attrition with complete information is evolutionarily robust.

Propositions
While the equilibrium in the War of Attrition with complete information is mixed, the War of Attrition with incomplete information has an equilibrium in pure strategies. The first theorem notes that this equilibrium is strict.
Theorem 1 The equilibrium given by
dw is an equilibrium with unique best replies.
Proof : Let φ be the inverse of β, that is φ(β(v)) = v for all v. β is C 1 and strictly increasing hence φ exists and is also C 1 and strictly increasing. It is clear that φ
Theorem 1 implies that β is evolutionarily stable. Note that have used a different method to prove that β is an ESS. They analyzed a finite partition of the set of valuations V and interpreted their results for this partition becoming infinitesimal fine. Theorem 1 offers an important insight: as the first condition of ESS, namely π(b, β) > π(b, β) ∀b = b is satisfied for all b, the second condition does not need to be checked. In what follows I explore whether there exists a strategy that violates local superiority, the second condition of evolutionary stability.
Consider a strategy γ that is close but distinct to the equilibrium strategy β in the sense that there are small ǫ 1 > ǫ 2 > 0 such that ǫ 2 < |γ(v) − β(v)| < ǫ 1 for all v ∈ V : v > 0. Suppose the population plays γ. Claim 1 shows that β fares weakly better against γ than γ against itself for any valuation v > 0 if the distribution of valuations satisfies a monotonicity assumption.
Definition 6 (MHR Barlow, Marshall & Proschan (1963) ) F satisfies the monotone hazard rate property if
is increasing in v for all valuations in V.
The Exponential-, Binomial-, Poisson-, Normal-, and uniform distributions all satisfy MHR. Note further that any cdf must satisfy MHR for at least some valuations v. Proof :
If γ(v) < β(v), then {w : γ(w) = β(v)} contains valuations that are larger than v and the derivative is positive. If γ(v) > β(v), the derivative is negative.
The claim has a weak foundation as the second derivative is not considered. Unfortunately, the sign of the second derivative is ambivalent,
as there is no restriction for γ ′ (v) and hence γ −1 ′ (b) for γ(v) close but distinct to β(v).
The following theorem seems to test claim 1 given above. Consider a strategy γ that is defined given equilibrium strategy β(v) = v 0
dw. The following theorem proposes a candidate strategy γ such that in a population of agents playing γ, the strategy β would have a selective disadvantage in any dynamic that is based on relative payoffs.
Theorem 2 If strictly increasing
Proof :
Note the ostensible strength of the theorem with respect to the interpretation of the model that is used. As it holds for all valuations,
, hence the conclusion also holds ex ante in a two player game without populations. This would indeed contradict claim 1.
The next theorem reveals the true strength of theorem 2 by stating that candidate γ must be equal to the equilibrium strategy β.
Theorem 3 If
Proof : Fix v and define the righthandside as function ξ(γ v ). As ξ is continuous and
there can be at most one fixed point. Obviously, ξ(β(v)) = β(v). Hence γ(v) = β(v) and claim 2 is empty.
Let us now consider a strategy γ that intersects the equilibrium strategy once at valuationv. It is clear that such a function exists and can be arbitrary close to β.
Theorem 4
The equilibrium strategy β is not a neighborhood invader strategy.
Proof : Let γ : V → R + be continuous, have a positive derivative for all v and let γ intersect β atv: γ(v) = β(v) with different slopes atv.
Theorem 5 The equilibrium strategy β is not continuously stable.
Proof : Consider a continuously differentiable and increasing strategy γ that intersects β atv and has |γ(v) − β(v)| < ǫ for all v and some positive ǫ. Then, for allṽ smaller than and close tov:
γ is ǫ-close to β,γ is δ-close to γ for arbitrary small δ and π(γ(ṽ)|ṽ, γ) < π(γ(ṽ)|ṽ, γ) wheneverγ is closer to β and vice versa. Hence β is not CSS.
Proposition 1 Denote byv the greatest intersection of γ and β that is smaller thanv. There is aṽ ∈ (v,v) such that π(γ(v)|v, γ) > π(β(v)|v, γ) ∀ v ∈ (ṽ,v).
Proof : By theorem 4 π(β(v)|v, γ) > π(γ(v)|v, γ) for all v close to and greater thanv. By continuity of π there must be an intermediate valueṽ <v such that π(γ(ṽ)|ṽ, γ) = π(β(ṽ)|ṽ, γ). Asv is the greatest intersection of β and γ that is smaller thanv,ṽ is the unique intersection of π(γ(v)|v, γ) and π(β(v)|v, γ) betweenv andv.
As a consequence, we can find for any positive ǫ a strategy γ that is close to β in the sense of the Prohorov metric, d(δ γ , δ β ) < ǫ such thatṽ <v and π(γ(v)|v, γ) > π(β(v)|v, γ) for all valuations v ∈ (ṽ,v).
Numeric Calculations
Consider a uniform distribution on [0, 1] and
With this parametrization there are two intersections of β and γ where the smaller intersection is atv = 0. The figures (3) -(4) below depict the strategies and payoffs for θ = 10 and θ = 1.1: Numeric calculations reveal that for θ → 1 the valueṽ where π(β(v)|v, γ) hits π(γ(v)|v, γ) from below approachesv. 
Conclusion
In this paper I analyze the dynamic stability of equilibria in second price allpay auctions with continuous bids and incomplete information on the valuation of the opponent. This is of particular interest as Bishop, Cannings & Maynard Smith (1978) show the existence of a unique ESS but show convergence only for finite strategies. This paper aims at explaining the gap. In games with finite strategy sets an ESS cannot be invaded by neither independent and undirected deviations nor correlated and close deviations. Bishop, Cannings & Maynard Smith (1978) test their ESS only against independent deviations. I show that there exists a correlated mass deviation strategy that violates local superiority for an open set of valuations. The share of these valuations is constant and does not depend on the level of uncertainty. I give a plausible interpretation of mass deviations which is valid for all Bayesian games. I show that the equilibrium strategy does not satisfy continuous stability.
